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Introduction
The term “knowledge” is used more and more frequently for the diagno-
sis of societal change (as in “knowledge society”). According to Bell (1973), 
since the 1970s we have been experiencing the ﬁrst phase of such a change 
towards a knowledge society, consisting of a rapid expansion of the aca-
demic system and a growth of investments in research and development in 
many countries. In this phase, as Castells (1996) points out, information 
technology has been rapidly changing the workplace as well as the com-
position of social organisations. In this ﬁrst phase, the focus has been on 
scientiﬁc knowledge, its production and application in expert cultures. Since 
the Mid-1990s, however, this focus has been widening, such that one can 
speak of a second phase of the knowledge society (Drucker 1994a, 1994b; 
Stehr 1994; see also Knorr-Cetina 1998; Krohn 2001). Now it is no longer 
only scientiﬁc knowledge that is seen as driving the change, but also ordi-
nary knowledge and practical knowledge, as know-how. The change is, as I 
would put it, autocatalytic, for typical of knowledge societies is “not the cen-
trality of knowledge and information, but the application of such knowledge 
and information to knowledge generation and information processing/com-
munication devices, in a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and 
the uses of innovation“ (Castells 1996: 32). Science has also been changing 
to be part of this loop, as shown in the rise of applied sciences and in the ac-
knowledgement of uncertainty and ignorance issues (cf. Heidenreich 2002: 
4 ff.; see also Hubig 2000 and Böschen & Schulz-Schaeffer 2003). The most 
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signiﬁcant change in this second phase however is the popularization of the 
Internet, that is seen as a key factor that governs societal change today.
So what exactly is this “knowledge” that is driving present knowledge 
societies? Can we rely on the philosophical analysis of the term to get some 
insight here? And, what are the ethical and political challenges that we had 
to face so far? The ﬁrst section of this paper will be devoted to answering 
these questions. The second section looks at present transformations: Much 
is said about “Web 2.0” at the moment, the rise of a “social internet”. In this 
section, we will therefore ask how knowledge is changing with these Web 
2.0 developments, and which ethical and political challenges they are bring-
ing about. In the third and ﬁnal section, we will discuss how the internet, 
information and communication technologies in general might evolve, and 
try to sketch ethical and political challenges that we may have to face in the 
future.
In short, we will be looking at the ﬂow of knowledge and how it may 
change as the internet continues to develop, and most importantly its result-
ing ethical and political challenges. Much of the following has been dis-
cussed in the past by other authors and much of it has also become common 
knowledge. The material here is presented in new frameworks. The ﬁrst sec-
tion redeﬁnes the concept of “knowledge” in an innovative way. The second 
section analyses the notion of “social” more closely than usual and combines 
the results with those of the ﬁrst section. In the third part the analysis focuses 
on possible paths for evolution of the internet with respect to its effects on 
knowing-how, as opposed to conventional analysis which has focused on 
knowing-that (if it has focused on knowledge effects at all).
1. Knowledge
Philosophy has been trying to get a grasp of knowledge from its very be-
ginning, and with immediate success. Has not Plato pointed out a deﬁnition 
of knowledge that remained valid ever since? According to this deﬁnition, 
knowledge is justiﬁed true belief. In fact, most contemporary philosophers 
seem to endorse this tripartite deﬁnition or a mild reﬁnement of it as neces-
sary and sufﬁcient (see Steup 2006 for an overview). Some of these reﬁne-
ments state, following Gettier 1963, that at least one additional condition has 
to be met for knowledge. Others, following Sartwell 1992, want to drop the 
justiﬁcation condition. This condition turned out to be most controversial; 
there is an ongoing debate about a notion of justiﬁcation that is suitable for 
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the deﬁnition of knowledge (if any notion is). 
Plato himself, however, did not subscribe to this deﬁnition (cf. the apo-
retic dialogue of Theaitetos, where he explores deﬁnitions of knowledge 
at great length). Through the centuries, there has always been criticism of 
this deﬁnition (cf. Ritter et al. 2004, 855-957). In the 20th century, a con-
sensus was developing on the tripartite deﬁnition as aiming at knowledge 
only insofar as it can be expressed in the paradigmatic sentence: S knows 
that p (with S a subject and p a proposition).2 The critics then argued that 
there is more to knowledge than just knowing-that, namely, that there is also 
knowing-how (S knows how to f, with f any action verb) and of knowing of 
objects (S knows x, with x any object) and that these forms of knowledge 
might be more fundamental.3 It is also easy to see that we attribute knowl-
edge not only to subjects but also to objects (y contains knowledge, with y 
any suitable object like a textbook or an electronic knowledge base). Both 
these criticisms are undermining the belief-condition. It was also in the 20th 
century that the value of the truth-condition became questionable: Following 
a coherence theory of truth, truth is grounded in justiﬁcation, and thus not 
independent from it. Following a pragmatic theory of truth, it is grounded in 
knowing-how, undermining the tripartite deﬁnition that takes knowledge as 
knowing-that. So all in all, the tripartite deﬁnition is problematic: It seems to 
be too narrow to grasp all important aspects of knowledge. 
Yet there is another philosophical tradition of deﬁning knowledge estab-
lished in the late 20th century, namely, deﬁning knowledge as some kind of 
information (e.g. Dretske 1981). But it did not lead us to a clear, uncontro-
versial and inclusive deﬁnition, either. This can be seen from facts that prop-
erties that shall distinguish knowledge from (other) information vary from 
author to author, that properties ascribed to information vary from author to 
author as well (and some conceive information quite narrowly, like there be-
ing only true information, which then is highly contested, cf. note 2 of this 
paper for a possible reason for this), and ﬁnally, that some authors deﬁne 
knowledge in terms of information while others deﬁne information in terms 
of knowledge. So all in all, the use of “information” to deﬁne knowledge is 
problematic: It means simply to pass the buck to a more technical, less well 
known term that itself is in greater need of being explained than knowledge 
is (see Gottschalk-Mazouz 2006 for more on this topic). 
Both the tripartite strategy and the information strategy of deﬁning knowl-
edge try to ﬁnd out what knowledge “really is”, but for our purpose it seems 
to be more interesting to ﬁnd out what knowledge “is like”, what it “can do”, 
i.e. to look for features, not for (alleged) substances of knowledge. Given its 
shortcomings, it may well be that these substantialist deﬁnitions are failing 
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to grasp the most important aspects of the knowledge that is driving knowl-
edge societies. While for inner-philosophical dispute it may have been pro-
ductive to deliberately narrow the focus,4 in an interdisciplinary discourse 
on knowledge societies, the same narrowing is unlikely to be productive. 
That is we should not simply stipulate philosophy’s (or any other academic 
discipline’s) deﬁnitions. We should rather at least try to meet the standard 
requirement of saving the phenomena (cf. Aristotle, EN 1145b2-7) with our 
deﬁnitions. To be able to do this, we have to show what the features of this 
knowledge are that makes it drive knowledge societies. One way of doing 
this is to look at contributions from key authors from Sociology, Economics, 
Psychology, Computer Science and Philosophy of Technology that led us 
to describe the current society as transforming into a knowledge society in 
the ﬁrst place. More speciﬁcally, to look at those parts of their contributions 
to the knowledge society discourse where they try to deﬁne knowledge. Al-
though these trials are far from convincing as deﬁnitions (as all of them are 
too loose, lopsided or in parts circular), they nevertheless underline impor-
tant typical features of knowledge. In the following, seven typical features 
of such knowledge will be exposed.5 These features are neither necessary 
nor sufﬁcient for knowledge. But after browsing through 40-50 deﬁnitions, 
and seeing the features repeating themselves, I think that they are typical for 
the kind of knowledge that is at stake here.
‘Knowledge’ will thus be reconstructed as a complex concept (Kom-
plexbegriff; see Gottschalk-Mazouz 2006: 25-27, similar to a so-called clus-
ter concept in linguistics) that is comprised of these seven typical features. 
I see this as a prerequisite to the discussion of the aptness of any strict deﬁni-
tion to sharpen the contours of the phenomenon “knowledge society” even 
further. So what does knowledge mean when we talk about “knowledge so-
ciety” and related matters such as “knowledge management”, “globalisation 
of knowledge” etc.? What are the typical features of such knowledge?
F1 Knowledge has a practical aspect
Knowledge is valued because it helps to solve problems. This includes 
problems of  orientation, evaluation and reﬂection. Thus, knowledge does 
not only consist in knowing objective facts. Moreover, due to its practical 
aspect, every chunk of knowledge is related to (practical) situations, not just 
one situation, but (typically) to situations of a similar kind, to (practically 
deﬁned, broader or more speciﬁc) domains of knowledge.
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F2 Knowledge is person-bound or not
Knowledge comes in two forms; it is either person-bound (as naturally in 
psychology) or is not person-bound (though rather bound to or incorporated 
in objects). In other words, it is either personalised or (externally) represent-
ed. If knowledge is perceived as a good or a commodity, as it is in economics 
and elsewhere (see Tofﬂer et al. 1994 for knowledge changing from being a 
public to being a private good), then this refers in large parts to represented 
knowledge (and to its practical use, of course, cf. F1). Representation is not 
constrained to knowledge of facts, but also to knowledge about possibilities, 
evaluations etc. To a certain extent, knowing-how can also be externally 
represented (e.g. in algorithms, recipes or in machines), and knowing of 
objects can be represented in paintings or novels. External representations 
can have the form of a text, picture or sound—anything that can be under-
stood as carrying knowledge. The whole dynamics of knowledge production 
and use cannot be understood without incorporating both personalised and 
represented knowledge, and its interdependencies. The production of per-
sonalised knowledge requires represented knowledge (if it remained bound 
to person x then it would never reach person y), and production and use of 
represented knowledge requires personalised knowledge.
F3 Knowledge has a normative structure
The normative ﬁne structure of knowledge is at least two-fold: knowl-
edge consists of recognised claims, i.e. claims that are not only recognised 
as claims (“knowledge candidates”) but also as successful claims. With re-
spect to F1, one can say that knowledge candidates are regarded as possi-
ble solutions to more or less given problems. The normative components of 
these claims can be further analysed, e.g. as consisting of normative com-
mitments and entitlements which allows to reformulate some of the insights 
of the tripartite deﬁnition (see Brandom 1994, 200-203, for this).
F4 Knowledge is internally networked
An entity taken as knowledge normally has an internal structure (i.e. its 
parts stand in certain relations to each other), and the whole entity stands 
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in certain relations to other (external) entities. I propose to conceive these 
relations as network-like. Learning also means integrating knowledge into 
already existing knowledge. This integration is happening in—explicit or 
implicit—processes of interpretation, justiﬁcation, application and comple-
mentation (to name just a few). Thus, knowledge has an internal structure 
whose parts are typically regarded as knowledge themselves (but on a differ-
ent level of knowledge formation). Knowledge typically does not consist of 
a single sentence or another single “atomic” representation. Typically, it has 
an internal structure that is not only syntactic or sentential, but it also has, for 
example, axiomatic, taxonomic or narrative structures. Metaphorically spo-
ken knowledge is a net that allows to catch ﬁsh of a certain kind in a given 
environment (i.e. for cognition and problem solving in a certain domain).
F5 Knowledge is externally networked
Knowledge has to be related to other knowledge if it is to count as knowl-
edge. This has already been the case according to the tripartite deﬁnition; 
for a belief has to be justiﬁed by something else to count as knowledge. 
The justiﬁer, however, is normally again justiﬁed or justiﬁable by something 
else, and all these justiﬁcations are very often possible in more than one way 
(quite rare there is “the” single reason for anything). So a holistic picture 
of the network character of knowledge appears: knowledge is networked 
with knowledge both internally (i.e. consisting of knowledge) and exter-
nally (i.e. supporting other knowledge as knowledge). The cut that singles 
out a chunk of knowledge seems somehow artiﬁcial then. It immediately 
follows that knowledge presupposes (other) knowledge in a way that we 
do not start with one single (and 100 percent certain) piece of knowledge 
and reconstruct our web of knowledge from there.
F6 Knowledge is dynamic
Castells (1996) characterised knowledge as generating knowledge in a 
“cumulative feedback loop”. In their best effort to reformulate the tripar-
tite deﬁnition according to their needs, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) wrote 
that ”knowledge is a dynamic human process of justifying personal belief 
toward the ‘truth’.” They explicitly added the notion of “dynamic” to such 
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deﬁnition while characterising it all in all as a process and not a state or a 
proposition. That knowledge is dynamic means that it is changing, and this 
change is not simply a growth, though be it a nonlinear one. Knowledge is 
acquired and disposed, is recognised, used/applied, sold and bought, written 
down, transferred, shared or kept secret, reformulated, etc. New knowledge 
can deﬂate old knowledge or make it more valuable. Knowledge can also be 
forgotten or disappear when unused for a long time. From time to time, there 
might also be larger conceptual changes (cf. Kuhn 1962 and Foucault 1966). 
Knowledge lives in time, so to say, but it also lives in space, as there are lo-
cal cultures of knowledge on the one hand and a global circulation of (some) 
knowledge on the other hand, and interactions between these two.
F7 Knowledge has institutional contexts
Institutions matter for knowledge generation, formation and distribution: 
This is evident from schools, universities, laboratories, libraries, archives etc. 
The acknowledgement of something as knowledge proceeds by “individual 
and institutional recognition”, as Hubig (1997: 173) puts it: It is recognition 
by other institutions or, ultimately, individual recognition that lets a given 
institution be in charge or become obsolete. But nevertheless, knowing is no 
longer an individualistic enterprise (if it ever was). It is easy to see that in 
modern functionally differentiated societies, those who possess knowledge 
are no longer individuals or small groups, only. And that hardly any subject 
nowadays can acquire relevant knowledge alone. But vice versa, knowledge 
is also important for the maintenance of institutions, it ﬁts to and supports 
certain institutions. Berger and Luckmann speak of knowledge as “shelter-
ing canopies over the institutional order” 1966: 102). Therefore, knowledge 
is reigned by institutions but also stabilizes institutions (and the practices 
and power relations that come with them).
These seven features are the most important features of knowledge, at 
least of the kind of knowledge that drives (evolving) knowledge societies. 
Before we proceed, let us have a quick look at how the tripartite deﬁnition 
shows up in these features. The belief criterion is reﬂected in F2 (“person-
bound”) and in F7 (as individual recognition). The justiﬁcation criterion is 
reﬂected in F5 (externally inferentially networked), and the truth criterion 
depending on your theory of truth in F1 (pragmatic), F5 (coherentist) or F2/
F7 (constructivist). However, the components of the tripartite deﬁnitions are 
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clearly neither necessary nor sufﬁcient conditions for knowledge, or at least 
not for the kind knowledge at stake here.
2. Present Internet challenges
From the very beginning of the knowledge society discourse, information 
technology has been seen as playing a major role as a catalyst of societal 
change. Nowadays, it is the internet in particular that is seen as playing this 
role. So what kind of knowledge is provided through the internet—and how 
might it be inﬂuenced by current and future technological change? 
In the light of the features pointed out above, the kind of knowledge that 
is provided through the internet can be characterised as representative (be-
cause it is not person-bound) and consisting of chunks of knowledge can-
didates (“chunks” because it is typically scattered and comes in pieces that 
have to be compared and assembled, and “candidates” because it has to be 
recognised as knowledge on an individual basis as institutional recognition 
mechanisms are mostly absent). It is highly dynamic, pages are added and 
altered rather quickly and so are the page links, and thus the external net-
working structures change. To be able to understand, assess and produc-
tively use these representations, a signiﬁcant level of skill and person-bound 
knowledge is necessary. The institutional and organisational background is 
also quite complex (you need at least a host, a published address, a provider, 
a phone/cable company and computer hardware, an operating system and a 
browser. All these things have to harmonize in a certain way if knowledge 
should be provided via “the internet”.
We will now give an overview of ethical and political challenges of the 
kinds of knowledge ﬂow that are made possible by the internet as it was 
known to us one or two years ago (Web 1.0), as we are experiencing it chang-
ing today (Web 2.0) and, in the next part of this paper, as we may experience 
it in the future (Web 3.0).
Challenges of Web 1.0 knowledge ﬂow included a great deal of topics that 
have been already widely discussed elsewhere (cf. Langford 2000; Hamelink 
2001), focusing on concerns over matters such as: Plurality of information 
sources, viewpoints, debunking; Access; Copyright; Privacy; Security; Free 
Speech/Censorship; Netiquette; Networking/Political organisation and ac-
tion; Sabotage, “defacing”; Neutrality of net infrastructure (e.g. ICANN). 
With Web 2.0 (cf. O’Reilly 2005 for this term), however, the social dimen-
sion is becoming more important and ﬂow patterns are changing according-
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ly. We began to see a shift from single to common uses (Wiki, Blog, Rating), 
from static to ﬂuid applications/Webservices instead of ﬁx programs. While 
with Web 1.0 we typically had a one upload/multiple download pattern (left 
in Fig. 1), with Web 2.0 we are now experiencing live streaming, collabora-
tive upload and automated partial download patterns (right in Fig. 1, top, 
middle and bottom, resp.).
Fig.1: Knowledge ﬂow patterns in Web 1.0 (left) and Web 2.0 (right). A, B, … are 
denoting users. 1, 2, … are denoting internet nodes. Explanations are given in the text.
For a closer analysis of these changes and their effects on knowledge ﬂows, 
we need some terminology that allows us to characterise the commonalities 
and “the social” that is involved in Web 2.0.  The concept of the social good 
can be used to accomplish this task. Two notions can be distinguished: (1) a 
social good that is affecting the social community, and (2) a social good that 
is affected by common action and/or affecting common action. Let us have 
a look at the latter where we ﬁnd the constitution, distribution and consump-
tion of these goods either as substantial or as normative. Persons constitute 
goods together either substantially (production) or normatively (evaluation), 
and if normatively than either driven by corresponding intentions (external 
goals; poiesis) or by mutual recognition (internal goals; praxis). Some goods 
can be constituted only together and only in a normative way (promenade, 
friendship, competition, contract, promise, we-intentions)—and dissolut-
ed as well (contract, promise). Taylor calls these goods “irreducibly social 
goods” and argues that they “essentially incorporate common understand-
ings of their value” (1997: 140). Sociality in the distribution of goods means 
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that persons distribute together—one gives while the other takes (1:1), also 
many-to-one, one-to-many and many-to-many (advanced peer-to-peer net-
works). Sociality in the consumption of goods is comprised of the substan-
tial consumption (use and dissolution) as well as the normative dissolution 
(of valuations), again in two respects: poietic (e.g. “this brand isn’t cool any 
longer”) and practical (as a reciprocal cancellation of a contract, promise 
etc.). Of course there are also combinations, such as the identity gains by 
consumption (music, books, clothes, etc.) as an example for the normative 
constitution of a good by the substantial consumption/use of another.
These terminological distinctions can be combined with the aspects of 
knowledge as explained in part one in a topical (7x6) matrix: 
Fig.2: Web 2.0 knowledge ﬂow analysis matrix: Knowledge features F versus sociality 
dimensions S.
This matrix makes it possible to ask a bundle of precise questions that cover 
the ﬁeld of Web 2.0 knowledge ﬂows. These questions are of the following 
form: “How are changes in Sx related to changes in Fy?” Two examples 
may illustrate this. Take the matrix ﬁeld (1,1) ﬁrst, where we hence want to 
know “How are changes in the substantial constitution of knowledge relate 
to changes of the practical aspects of knowledge?” The answer is that there 
is a broader scope of (sometimes quite trivial) practices addressed (how-
tos, recipes, after-buy experiences, “Lebensberatung”, etc.), that many many 
persons are in a position to contribute, and that ﬁnally an explosion of pro-
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duction of everyday-knowledge (loosely structured boards, more rigidly 
structured Wikis, …) results. The second example is (2,7): “How are chang-
es in the substantial distribution of knowledge related to changes in the in-
stitutional/organisational contexts of knowledge?”. The answer is that these 
changes are juridical (e.g. copyright- and patent-law), economic (changing 
user fees/ﬂatrates), organisational (broadband, networked (home) servers), 
that distribution patterns change (circulation of source code, download and 
upload of audio/video content, ﬁlesharing, plagiarism), and that applications 
and content change incrementally, automatically and with open-end, leading 
to a “perpetual beta” of software (cf. O’Reilly 2005) and knowledge. The 
best illustration for this may be the Wikipedia. —Of course, these answers 
have to be ﬁgured out more in detail. By working through the whole bundle 
of matrix questions, however, the various aspects of the problem that are 
already addressed in the literature (c.f. Quigley 2007) can be organised and 
checked for blind spots.
Cross-cutting topics that attracted recent attention—ignorance/non-
knowledge and social exclusion in particular—can also be addressed within 
the framework of the above matrix. The former can be understood as indi-
cating “defects” of some feature of Fx (e.g. F5: Missing justiﬁcation) in the 
presence of other features that are attributable. The latter can, in general, 
be seen as multiple involuntary social uncoupling (education, work, health, 
politics). In a knowledge society, this consists in being not involved in many 
matrix ﬁeld activities at once (“patterns of exclusion”; identifying these may 
help to develop strategies for inclusion as well).
3. Future internet challenges
When speculating about the future of the internet, two visions are con-
stantly referred to: Semantic Web and Ubiquitous Computing. The former 
means to provide ontological metadata, such that men and machine can get 
rid of synonymies and use knowledge in a more productive fashion (see Her-
man 2007). The latter means an infrastructure that contains standardised IT 
elements with ad-hoc node updating, such that the virtual-real and online-
ofﬂine distinctions vanish in a so-called “augmented reality” or better yet in 
“augmented actuality”6. To establish an augmented actuality by facilitating 
human action was the core objective of ubiquitous computing:
 
Inspired by the social scientists, philosophers, and anthropologists at PARC, we have 
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been trying to take a radical look at what computing and networking ought to be like. 
We believe that people live through their practices and tacit knowledge so that the most 
powerful things are those that are effectively invisible in use. This is a challenge that 
affects all of computer science. Our preliminary approach: Activate the world. Provide 
hundreds of wireless computing devices per person per ofﬁce (…) This has required 
new work in operating systems, user interfaces, networks, wireless, displays, and many 
other areas. We call our work “ubiquitous computing”. This is different from PDA’s, 
dynabooks, or information at your ﬁngertips. It is invisible, everywhere computing that 
does not live on a personal device of any sort, but is in the woodwork everywhere. 
(Weiser 1996). 
In fact, this infrastructure seems to be about to develop. You ﬁnd Linux driv-
ing a supercomputer, a laptop, a handy or a (wrist) watch. Your TV, fridge 
or car might also be running on Linux. What’s more is that microproces-
sors and components are also becoming more and more standardized (Intel, 
ARM, PPC, MIPS etc.).
The impact of these two visions for the ﬂow of knowledge are classically 
seen in the domain of symbolically represented, explicit knowing-that. For 
the Semantic Web, this seems to be evident because the whole idea is to at-
tach explicit ontological categories to each entry. For Ubiquitous Computing, 
this is less evident, I think. Nevertheless, the focus has been on knowing-
that effects (privacy etc.), and on identity effects (Heesen et al. 2005; IRIE 
2007). But there is also a direct impact on action (knowing-how, implicit), 
and this is my main point here: The (social) constitution, distribution and 
consumption of knowing-how may become possible now, because in addi-
tion to software (and this means: algorithms) also ﬁrmware, training data, 
learned patterns, etc. can be shared, parts of the infrastructure can dynami-
cally and cooperatively be updated, reprogrammed or deactivated. The rest 
of this text elaborates on what this means to us and ask for the corresponding 
ethical and political challenges.
The difference in focus can be explained with respect to the action cycle: 
1. aiming, 2. executing, 3. evaluating (goal reached?), and then starting to 
aim again. We (and our things) are more and more relying on network assist-
ance in (1, 2, 3), as the things get more responsive, in a broad sense of this 
word, and we get more responsive to them. We form men-machine-systems 
of cognition and action, then. According to the classical analysis, Web 3.0 
affects (1) and (3): Things will let us know, provide us with knowledge about 
possible aims and suitable means; things will talk to each other but ﬁnally to 
us; we will live in information-enhanced environments; we will be able to 
search in real space (Google Maps/Earth). According to the complementary 
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analysis proposed here, maybe even greater challenges affect (2). Our means 
of action are directly at stake. As things talk to things (other people’s things), 
they facilitate the surveillance of our actions, and as their talking changes 
the behaviour of the things, they facilitate the surveillance of our actions 
such that they might function otherwise or not any more (functions include, 
but are not limited to, data transfer).
The list of ethical and political challenges according to the classical anal-
ysis is long enough (see Heesen et al. 2005 or Greenﬁeld 2006 for an over-
view). It comprises RFID tagging (attaching short range wireless unique 
identiﬁer and data storage) allowing for the surveillance of trajectories of 
small things (and of their owners…), audiovisual recognition allowing for 
the logging and storing of data on real and virtual operations and moves, 
the storage of this data for an indeﬁnite time, the combination of this huge 
amount of data (data mining) and the combination of this “ﬂow data” with 
static data (registers, knowledge bases, harvested WWW information—a 
semantic web would be very useful for this). Thus, the main challenge ac-
cording to the classical analysis is privacy, broadly construed (“it’s all about 
knowing-that”). 
According to the complementary analysis proposed here, there are even 
more ethical/political challenges to be considered. Not only the surveillance 
of real and virtual moves, but also the control of these moves (functionings), 
leading to a direct control of action (not only by law or incentives). As soon 
as these functionings are compromised, we are deprived of knowing-how, 
we simply cannot do certain things anymore. Political/subversive action thus 
becomes important, and an example of this is hacking functions/ﬁrmware 
versus control and DRM (“digital restrictions management”, as some cynics 
say). The struggle will be more about what you can do, not what you know 
or what you are allowed to do, and thus about power in the classical sense as 
conceivable as control over means (cf. Weber 1980: 28). It will be about an 
infrastructure design according to norms/values (where privacy is respected 
or disrespected by design, where control might be built in, where the infra-
structure design itself might be intransparent and exclusive).
A shift in control over means might also induce conceptual changes by 
mediality effects (Hubig 2006: 183 ff.; 229 ff.): Our self-experience is medi-
ated through our (more and more technically enhanced) grip on the world, 
and our self-understanding is more and more governed by technological 
analogies. These shifts may lead to a redeﬁnition of the actor-means distinc-
tion and of concepts of identity and personhood. Many young people have 
no problem to publish even very personal things in the internet. Many cus-
tomers willingly give away the data on customer behaviour for free or for 
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minor bonuses. This indicates that the concepts of personhood and privacy 
might be changing, that are central to western culture, but that are quite dif-
ferently perceived in other cultures anyway (Nakada and Tamura 2005; see 
also Hongladarom and Ess 2006). It seems to me that for various reasons 
(security related, business related, cultural, etc.) mutual surveillance is be-
coming more and more accepted. Will mutual control become accepted as 
well? However it will be,7 in the confusing struggles over control, personal 
or mutual trust will be more important than (unenforceable and inadequately 
simple) rules or oughts, such that virtue ethics might be an adequate frame-
work if one wanted to analyse this point more in depth.
In summing up, the Web 3.0 scenario may ultimately look like this: We 
will be experiencing smarter, adaptive, responsive, but less robust and less 
versatile things (because they are programmed to a certain extent). We will 
have a Semantic web that makes smart things smarter (and the automatic 
surveillance and control or their use more effective). We will also encounter 
artiﬁcial agents: programs or machines that act in the name of an individual 
(or organisation) with legally binding consequences (but unclear account-
ability) and effects on competitive advantage (raising fairness issues). First 
signs of this are experienced today, such as when you are placing an eBay 
bid today, you are competing with humans directly, but also with eBay’s 
bidding agents and with eBay snipers—but this is only software. We will 
experience the propagation of candidates of what is traditionally referred 
to as know-how, but in this case embodied in machines. It will to a certain 
extent be possible to share different ﬁrmware modules, training data etc. of 
our “smart things” that support our actions. It will depend on individual and 
institutional recognition whether what is provided by these machines and 
their algorithms counts as know-how, and whether it is regarded as useful, 
annoying or dangerous. 
The trends in controlling knowing-that and knowing-how seem to follow 
a similar logic. In the name of anti-terror warfare, some people not only want 
to know what you are knowing but also what you are doing and plan to do. 
It may even be communicated to us all that they want to know all this. This 
may lead to large scale action reporting and surveillance. But, moreover, the 
same people also want to be able to intercept your actions and to force other 
actions. This may lead to large scale action that will result in further control. 
The technical infrastructure that we are about to establish will in principal 
allow for all this to happen. 
These options are very attractive to both the “good guys” and the “bad 
guys”: Federal agencies, police etc. on the one hand and organized crime, 
terrorists etc. on the other. The most successful strategies, however, will not 
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necessarily be high-tech. As soon as one side is relying on the new digital 
options, the other side might try to establish analogue counter-cultures. In 
the long run however, these options may very well become more radical over 
time, for mainstream technologies may converge towards NBIC (Nano-Bio-
Information-Cognitive Technology). This would lead to opportunities for 
ﬁne-scale surveillance and control of even more (biophysical) processes: An 
analysis of the formation of a “biopower” (cf. Foucault 1974) and that of a 
“technopower” sketched above may have to be combined accordingly then 
if one still wants to be able to analyse the political and ethical challenges of 
knowledge ﬂows in the internet age.
Endnotes
1 The ﬁrst part of this paper draws on work that was presented in Munich, Berlin and 
Bayreuth. It has been published in an extended version in German elsewhere 
(Gottschalk-Mazouz 2007). The second part was also presented in Bayreuth and 
was previously unpublished. Some ideas of the third part were presented in Stutt-
gart, where I have learned a lot about Ubiquitous Computing while I participated 
in preparing the Stuttgart Collaborative Research Centre SFB 627 in 2003, and 
also thereafter from the people working in this centre and their publications (see 
http://www.nexus.uni-stuttgart.de). I am currently elaborating this part for a Ger-
man anthology on electronic surveillance (Gottschalk-Mazouz, to be published). 
I want to thank the various audiences as well as the Kirchberg audience for their 
helpful remarks. My special thanks go to Nadia Mazouz for intense discussions on 
how a philosopher should deal with an interdisciplinary subject like this. The views 
expressed here and any remaining errors and ﬂaws should nevertheless be attributed 
to myself.
2 For “information”, there is no such model sentence. This may be one reason why ordi-
nary language intuitions apparently do not converge on, say, the question of a truth 
presupposition of information.
3 See Ryle (1949) and Russell (1929) for these types of knowing, while for the priority 
of knowing-how to knowing-that credits are frequently given to Wittgenstein and 
his remarks on Rule-Following (see PI 185-243).
4 Personally, I do not think so, so I followed the analytic discussion to some of their dead 
ends and tried to reconstruct a broader, process view of knowledge from the writings 
of Plato, Aristotle and Brandom in my Habilitation (Gottschalk-Mazouz 2006).
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5 They were extracted from the literature elsewhere (Gottschalk-Mazouz 2006). The 
quotes used there stem either from key writings frequently given reference to, from 
textbooks or from leaders in their disciplinary scientiﬁc ﬁeld (be it on a national or 
international scale).
6 I prefer “virtual actuality” here because there will be changes in the domain of action 
as well.The term is borrowed from Hubig 2007 who uses it to distinguish reality (all 
that is the case) from actuality (“Wirklichkeit” as all that we experience) reintroduc- 
ing the latin realitas/actualitas distinction to the virtuality debate.
7 In Gottschalk-Mazouz (to be published) it is argued for a positive answer.
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